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Abstract
We know that there are cross-cultural differences in psychological variables, such as individualism/
collectivism. But it has not been clear which of these variables show relatively the greatest 
differences. The Survey of World Views project operated from the premise that such issues 
are best addressed in a diverse sampling of countries representing a majority of the world’s 
population, with a very large range of item-content. Data were collected online from 8,883 
individuals (almost entirely college students based on local publicizing efforts) in 33 countries 
that constitute more than two third of the world’s population, using items drawn from measures 
of nearly 50 variables. This report focuses on the broadest patterns evident in item data. The 
largest differences were not in those contents most frequently emphasized in cross-cultural 
psychology (e.g., values, social axioms, cultural tightness), but instead in contents involving 
religion, regularity-norm behaviors, family roles and living arrangements, and ethnonationalism. 
Content not often studied cross-culturally (e.g., materialism, Machiavellianism, isms dimensions, 
moral foundations) demonstrated moderate-magnitude differences. Further studies are needed 
to refine such conclusions, but indications are that cross-cultural psychology may benefit from 
casting a wider net in terms of the psychological variables of focus.
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We know that psychological variables sometimes show cross-cultural differences. Indeed, 
large bodies of scientific literature have arisen around those variables presumed to best repre-
sent important cross-cultural differences. Such variables include dimensions such as individu-
alism and collectivism (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), 
tightness and looseness (Gelfand et al., 2011; Triandis, 1989), and multidimensional research 
domains such as values (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990), social axioms (Leung & Bond, 2004), and 
normative practices (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). The focus of these 
variables corresponds to consensual definitions of culture in terms of shared beliefs, values, 
and norms. Investigations of such key cultural variables are a major focus of cross-cultural 
psychology.
But which of these variables show the greatest magnitude of differences between populations? 
Do all of them show sizable differences? Do other variables than these show even greater differ-
ences, and thus need more attention? Answers to these questions remain unclear, for at least two 
reasons. First, there have been few studies that compare many of these variables with respect to 
magnitude of cross-cultural differences. Second, there have not been clearly framed comparisons 
to distinguish large magnitudes of difference from smaller ones.
Among the studies relevant to addressing these questions, there have been significant limi-
tations. One is the modest range of variables: It has been typical for each study to include at 
most roughly a dozen psychological variables. Moreover, the representation of countries typi-
cally gives an unfaithful picture of relative contributions to total world population: Western 
countries along with, in some cases, East Asian countries tend to be over-represented, with the 
rest of the world under-represented; even where the range of countries is unusually wide, one 
often sees a much denser sampling of European nations. For example, about 69% of the 
national happiness data found in the World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven, 2010) were 
collected from European and North American samples (Tov & Au, 2013). These tendencies 
might derive from how cross-cultural psychology projects are often organized, with partici-
pants found mainly in those countries with the largest concentrations of psychologists. The 
outcome is understandable, but leads to our having only a patchwork representation of popula-
tions as well as variables.
The Survey of World Views project was designed with the aim of overcoming limitations in 
addressing the crucial questions identified above: In what variables does one find greater or 
lesser between-population differences, and how does this correspond to common variable-selection 
preferences in cross-cultural psychology? To provide an incrementally clearer answer than previ-
ous studies have provided, this project differed from them in two crucial ways. It included a very 
large range of item-content: several dozen variables which might be compared with respect to 
degrees of similarity and difference across samples. And it featured a stronger proportional rep-
resentation of the “global south” (Africa, south/southeast Asia, Latin America) than has been 
typical in these studies, so as to represent a majority of the world’s population by its selection of 
countries. Items predominantly referred to beliefs, some of which could be considered values and 
statements as to what are or should be norms. The categories of content are heterogeneous, and 
difficult to summarize in a concise label for the data set. Because these categories all involve 
“views” held by individuals, the label “Survey of World Views” seemed to fit: The project elic-
ited a diverse range of views about the world, as reflected in many psychological variables, as 
experienced by respondents from many parts of the world.
Method
Participants
Data were collected online: 8,883 individuals in 33 countries provided some input data for this 
Survey of World Views in 2012. About 90% of them provided sufficient responses—given 
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whatever challenges they faced with computer hardware, internet access, and various distractions 
that conduce to not finishing a survey—to be usable for analyses here.
The aim was to sample students from institutions of higher education, from some diversity of 
fields of study. College students were sought so as to enable recruitment within a short time 
frame and to enable standardized online administration. Recruiting students minimized between-
population differences in level of education; fully representative populations from each country 
would have large between-population differences in education level. For some research pur-
poses, it might be useful to remove a potential confound of country with education level (perhaps 
related to reading level, thus having an effect on understanding of the questionnaire items). 
Students with ample secondary education may show less response-bias (acquiescence) variance 
than do representative samples (Rammstedt, Kemper, & Borg, 2013). Diener, Diener, and Diener 
(1995) found, with reference to subjective well-being, that college-student samples give moder-
ately accurate estimates of the between-country differences one finds with more representative 
surveys that are more difficult to obtain.
In every country, the method of recruitment was the same, and carried out locally, not over the 
worldwide web. Cooperating instructional faculty distributed flyers to students in as wide a vari-
ety of classes and fields of study as they could arrange. Each student received one flyer, contain-
ing information about the study, the compensation to be earned by participating, the online 
address of the data-collection website, and a login code unique to that flyer. Recipients could then 
elect whether to participate on their own time, through any internet access point available to 
them. In countries where it was practical to order from Amazon.com or an affiliate, participants 
were issued an Amazon gift certificate upon completion of the survey; this gift coupon was 
approximately US $20 in value, except in a few of the relatively affluent countries the value was 
set very slightly higher to provide needed incentive. In countries where an Amazon gift coupon 
was not practical, participants were sent $20 via Western Union money transfer.
For each country, a separate data-collection portal was constructed. In most cases, the survey 
and all materials appeared in the major national language, following translation (using back-
translation checks) conducted under the auspices of the project. The languages used included 
English (Kenya, India, Singapore, United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, Canada, United States), 
Spanish (Spain, Mexico, Peru, Argentina), Chinese (China, Taiwan), Arabic (Morocco, Egypt), 
plus the following languages that were country-specific for this project: Kiswahili (Tanzania), 
Amharic (Ethiopia), Turkish (Turkey), Bengali (Bangladesh), Nepali (Nepal), Malay (Malaysia), 
Filipino/Tagalog (Philippines), Thai (Thailand), Korean (Korea), Japanese (Japan), Russian 
(Russia), Ukrainian (Ukraine), Polish (Poland), Greek (Greece), German (Germany), Dutch 
(Netherlands), and Portuguese (Brazil).
Where feasible, to contribute to diversity in sampling, participants were recruited from more 
than one site (i.e., educational institution) in each country. Moreover, we sought to have partici-
pating students within any one institution come from diverse fields of study (e.g., business, edu-
cation, humanities, social science). A large proportion (nearly 60%) of the cooperating faculty 
were not in psychology departments.
A population-sampling strategy was set out in advance. Countries were included in an attempt 
to represent the world, both in terms of demographic footprint and of economic impact. The first 
and second authors created a ranking of the countries of the world based on their relative contri-
butions to world population and to the aggregated world gross domestic product (GDP). The 
larger the average of these ranked contributions, the higher the priority placed on identifying and 
coordinating with instructional faculty within the country. We did not succeed in locating coop-
erating faculty in some high-priority countries (e.g., Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria), but in most cases 
potentially cooperating faculty could be identified.
Those 33 countries sampled have aggregated populations amounting to some 67.3% (4.7 billion) 
of the world’s population; and when the GDP of these 33 countries is aggregated, the total makes 
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up some 76.2% of the gross aggregate domestic products of all countries in the world (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2012). It is fair to say that young people from most of the world (whether in 
terms of demographic footprint or economic impact) are represented in the 33 countries in this 
project. Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) have pointed to the predominance of “WEIRD” 
samples (from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich Democracies) in psychological and even 
much cross-cultural research. The countries sampled here are clearly not biased in favor of Western 
industrialized democracies, though the method of online survey administration did make it more 
practical to recruit rather educated samples that are probably richer than average for their country.
The recruitment goal was roughly 300 participants (plus or minus 100) per country, a sample 
size sufficient for multivariate analyses within each country was desirable. Variation in sample 
size by country arose due to local, practical factors (e.g., numbers of flyers distributed).
Table 1 displays demographic characteristics for samples from the 33 countries, grouped into 
geographic regions for easier understanding of how world populations were sampled. Table 1 
includes sample size, gender, mean age, and mean-percent-missing data. There is substantial 
variation between countries in degree of missing data, much of this clearly due to country-spe-
cific challenges in our online surveys. In some countries, the data-collection portal sometimes 
operated more fitfully due to slow connection speeds, and at times the U.S. computer server was 
slowed when too much data were arriving all at once. Thus, mean-percent-missing should not be 
interpreted as a substantive country or cultural characteristic.
Materials
The survey used items drawn from measures of nearly 50 variables drawn from 17 distinct 
sources, each involving in some way shared beliefs, values, and norms that might be shared 
across persons (thus fitting a rather consensual definition of “cultural”). The goal was to be as 
comprehensive as possible within a moderate-length questionnaire. Cross-cultural psychology 
has no unified theory to guide selection of variables, and a heterogeneous selection, representing 
diverse theoretical approaches, might provide the most fuel for future theoretical development. 
These sources are described here in brief summary form.
GLOBE normative practices. There were 43 items drawn from House et al. (2004), indexing dimen-
sions of performance orientation, future orientation, humane orientation, gender egalitarianism, 
assertiveness, collectivism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance (the last four substantially 
related to scales of Hofstede, 2001). Items referred to as-is societal practices (not values) with a 
“referent-shift” format—respondents described characteristics of people in their country rather 
than of themselves, with items usually beginning “In this society . . . ”
Cultural tightness–looseness. Six items, drawn from Gelfand et al. (2011), also had a referent-shift 
format, all beginning “In this country . . . ” Except as indicated, for all other sources described 
below, item presentation did not involve a referent-shift format.
Social axioms. Thirty core items (defined based on most consistent univocal associations with the 
intended dimension) were drawn from Leung et al. (2002). Social-axiom dimensions include 
cynicism, fate control, religiosity, social complexity, and reward for application.
Individualism and collectivism (idiocentrism and allocentrism). The 16 items of Triandis and Gelfand 
(1998) were included: 4 items each for vertical (hierarchical) individualism, vertical collectiv-
ism, horizontal (egalitarian) collectivism, and horizontal individualism.
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Values. The full 10 items of the Short Schwartz Values Survey (SSVS; Lindeman & Verkasalo, 
2005) were included. Each of the 10 values-clusters proposed by Schwartz (Schwartz & Bilsky, 
1990) is represented on this brief form by one item.
Table 1. Demographic Characteristics for 33 Countries, Grouped by Region.
Country/territory/
region n % Female Mean age Mean-%-missing
Africa (sub-Saharan)
 Tanzania 256 32 24.8 5.38
 Kenya 288 33 24.6 2.99
 Ethiopia 381 29 24.0 3.71
North Africa/Middle East
 Morocco 441 50 25.6 4.75
 Egypt 38 35 21.9 2.62
 Turkey 416 54 21.1 3.79
South Asia
 Bangladesh 272 22 21.7 3.15
 India 390 62 21.1 10.15
 Nepal 346 59 21.0 6.68
Southeast Asia
 Malaysia 324 66 20.5 6.05
 Philippines 425 68 20.0 10.68
 Thailand 350 72 21.6 3.92
 Singapore 304 55 21.7 7.38
East Asia
 China (Mainland) 350 73 20.8 15.62
 Taiwan 395 64 22.6 5.69
 Korea 58 43 26.2 6.84
 Japan 429 63 20.9 8.67
East/Southeast Europe
 Russia 69 83 22.3 1.25
 Ukraine 244 64 20.2 6.78
 Poland 225 88 21.2 0.71
 Greece 246 70 21.8 2.21
Western Europe
 Spain 379 64 22.7 7.29
 Germany 349 52 23.6 3.21
 Netherlands 30 60 24.1 1.33
 United Kingdom 229 62 22.7 1.79
 Ireland 33 68 32.0 12.80
North America/Australia
 Australia 67 65 20.3 0.35
 Canada 220 61 21.8 2.03
 United States 425 57 21.9 4.26
Latin America
 Mexico 157 65 26.6 10.65
 Peru 309 61 21.8 12.83
 Argentina 243 56 24.3 11.99
 Brazil 195 79 22.2 1.17
Note. Mean-%-missing is the mean percent of missing responses across 281 prime survey items.
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Family values. There were eight items from a measure of family values (Georgas, 1989), with four 
selected (based on van de Vijver, Mylonas, Pavlopoulos, & Georgas, 2006, Table 7.8) for each of 
two dimensions: hierarchy (focused on gender roles) and relationships (i.e., cohesiveness reputa-
tion, obligations).
Isms dimensions. Forty-six items represented factors (Saucier, 2000, 2013) defined from the 
domain of dictionary terms ending in –ism: Tradition-Oriented Religiousness, Subjective Spiri-
tuality, Unmitigated Self-Interest, Communal Rationalism, and Inequality-Aversion.
Moral foundations. Included was the 22-item short form of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
(Graham et al., 2011), which assesses five major criteria used to distinguish right from wrong: 
Harm/Care, Justice/Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Purity/Divinity.
Religiousness and devout behaviors. The five items of the Duke Religion Index (DRI; Koenig, Pat-
terson, & Meador, 1997) reference not only the value accorded to religion, but also religious 
experiences, practices, and meeting-attendance.
Materialism. Four items drawn from a synthesis of the empirical literature on materialist values 
(Shen-Miller, Saucier, & Pan, 2013) were included.
Machiavellianism. Five items drawn from studies of core content in measures of Machiavellian-
ism (Saucier, Chen, & Bettenhausen, 2014) were included.
Nationalism. There were four items capturing ethnonationalism as in the theory of Anthony D. 
Smith, and two items capturing a multiculturalist civic nationalism (Saucier, 2014).
Extremist thinking patterns. Seventeen items came from a very brief overall measure of extremist 
thinking styles (from Saucier, Akers, Shen-Miller, Stankov, & Knezevic, 2009; Stankov, Saucier, 
& Knezevic, 2010).
Proneness to aggress. Three items from previous work (Henry, 2009) captured readiness to aggress 
vengefully to insults or slights to honor (within a “culture of honor” syndrome).
Amoralism. Fourteen items based on the construct as defined by Stankov and Knezevic (2005).
Personality. Although it does reflect norms, values, and beliefs to some degree, personality was 
not expected to generate strong population differences (Poortinga, van de Vijver, & van Hemert, 
2002), making it an interesting domain for comparison. As benchmarks for this domain, there 
were 40 items referencing individual behavioral dispositions in the Big Six model (Saucier, 
2009), including all of the items in the 36QB6 measure (Thalmayer, Saucier, & Eigenhuis, 2011). 
The Big Six model is akin to the HEXACO model of personality structure but is based on a 
broader range of studies of personality-language.
Regularity-norm behaviors. The selection of variables detailed above tends to omit content ori-
ented to a type of social norms that sociologists describe, distinct from the more restrictive norms 
about what one ought or ought not to do. These norms involve “behavioral regularities that gener-
ate social expectations without any moral obligations,” although deviations from common prac-
tice can still lead to costs being imposed (Hechter & Opp, 2001, p. xiii). The literature in 
anthropology (e.g., Levinson & Malone, 1980) and cultural psychology (e.g., Heine, 2008) sug-
gested six kinds of regularity-oriented social norms differing across populations (involving 
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alcohol, sex, sleeping arrangements, and beliefs about ancestors, spirit-possession, and sorcery 
and witchcraft); these were represented in referent-shift items beginning “In this society . . . ”
Analyses
The present analyses are conducted entirely at the item level, treating each item as a variable on 
its own (as in Funder, Furr, & Colvin, 2000; Westen & Shedler, 2007). This approach allows for 
a look at big-picture patterns in the data without delving into the relative strengths and weak-
nesses of various scales that are composed of aggregated items. Thus, these analyses leave aside 
the issue of whether various collections of items function similarly together as scales measuring 
one or another intended construct; indeed, it would be impossible to report all required analyses 
around this issue (for nearly 50 intended scales) in a reasonably sized paper. The present analyses 
also leave aside the issue of whether there are between-population differences in response biases, 
operating on the assumption that these differences are no more than moderate in size and tend to 
operate rather similarly across a large range of content. Given the likelihood that studies of 
response biases and of specific scales in these data will provide some refinements to exact esti-
mates provided here, the focus here is only on those relatively large and dramatic effects least 
likely to be affected by such refinements.
To assess how well individual items discriminate between different country samples, we 
report eta-squared coefficients, which reflects the “proportion of the variation in Y that is associ-
ated with membership of the different groups defined by X” (Richardson, 2011, p. 136). In other 
words, eta-squared reflects how well a particular item differentiates between respondents from 
different countries, referencing the proportion of variance that occurs between groups/samples. 
Similarly, we generated intraclass correlations (ICC[1]) as the ratio of the intercept to the total 
(intercept + residual) variance via Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML) estimation (of cova-
riance parameters) under the Mixed procedure in SPSS. Although eta-squared is generally 
thought to include some upward bias not present in ICC estimates, particularly when group/
sample sizes are small (Bliese & Halverson, 1998), some recent work indicates that it may be less 
biased at low effect sizes (Shieh, 2012). Both indices (eta-squared and ICC) reward variables for 
having either low variation within groups or high variation between groups; a variable with large 
variation (i.e., disagreement) within groups can only achieve a large index value by showing 
extraordinarily large variation between groups. The focus being on directionless effect size mea-
sures, that is, the raw magnitude of effect, squared coefficients are reported. The caution of 
Matsumoto, Grissom, and Dinnel (2001) is pertinent: Squared coefficients give an illusory small-
ness, an eta-squared of .10 is not a small effect.
The aforementioned coefficients were generated for 281 items, using the maximum sample 
sizes available for each item. To observe results under conditions in which response biases are 
summarily removed, the same analyses were repeated with data that had been ipsatized (stan-
dardized within-subject to eliminate individual differences in use of response scales) after rescal-
ing all responses scales to the same 1-to-6 range. Some analyses grouped the 281 items in the 
total item-pool into 18 categories based on their provenance (i.e., the various sources described 
above).
In the present analyses, data from only 30 countries were utilized. The de-selection of small-
sample data from Australia, Ireland, and the Netherlands removed only 1.5% of the participants 
(i.e., 130 cases), but lessened the tendency toward an over-representation of European-origin 
populations. It reduced the proportion of countries from Europe (plus United States, Canada, and 
Australia) to one third of the total set of countries, rather than nearly 40% if these three countries 
had been included. For reference, some 16% of the global human population resides in Europe, 
United States, Canada, and Australia combined; the countries comprised therein have more than 
a 50% share of globally aggregated GDP (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).
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The analyses reported here excluded all of those relatively few participants who indicated 
they were not a student at any higher education institution.
Results
Unsurprising given the sample size, all items had statistically significant country effects.
Table 2 presents the items showing the largest cross-population differences across 30 coun-
tries. The 42 items with the largest eta-square values are shown, and include all items that had 
either an eta-square or an ICC value of at least .20 (a large effect for country-of-origin). Eta-
square and ICC tended to be quite similar, although eta-square was more often the higher of the 
two. Ipsatizing lowered the coefficients more markedly, most often by .04 to .07 in Table 2 
(whether eta-square or ICC). For each item, the source (among the 17 described above) is indi-
cated in the table by a single-letter code.
We believe that the 30-country selection has the strongest rationale. But results were indistin-
guishable whether one used the selected 30 countries, all 33 countries, or just those 27 countries 
that had sample sizes above 150. Across the 281 items, the eta-squared values from these three 
varying selections of countries correlated .9995 or higher with each other, and no eta-squared 
value differed by more than .007 across these three ways of computing the values.
Violating expectation, the largest differences were not on those contents most frequently 
emphasized in cross-cultural psychology (e.g., social axioms, cultural tightness, individualism 
and collectivism, Schwartz values). None of the items from these sources had eta-squared values 
exceeding .20. For normative practices (from GLOBE), large differences arose for only three 
items referencing how children are reared or relate to their parents. Overall, for contents from any 
source country-of-origin typically accounted for only about 10% of variance in the item. 
According to conventional standards (J. Cohen, 1992), these are medium-sized effects.
The larger differences were in contents involving religion, regularity-norms, and ethnonation-
alism. These were large effects: Country-of-origin accounted for 20% to 40% of the variance in 
the item. Four of the five items with the highest eta-squared were from the DRI, the remaining 
DRI item had the 16th highest, and the 3rd highest eta was for a non-DRI item involving the 
importance of religion. All four of the ethnonationalism items had coefficients near to or above 
.20, and five of the six regularity-norm items did. No other source had more than one third of its 
items beyond this .20 threshold.
Table 3 provides the mean of eta-squared values for the items derived from each source. It 
documents the correspondence between item-content and cross-cultural differences in a sum-
mary way, ranking the sources based on average eta-squared value of items in their part of the 
item pool. Consistent with the portrayal just offered based on individual items, the DRI, ethnon-
ationalism, and the regularity-norm items showed markedly more between-population differ-
ences than did items from any other source.
Not shown in Table 3 are the average eta-squared values for dimensions within each item-pool 
source, three of which deserve a brief mention. First, within the “isms” source, eight items are 
intended to measure beliefs associated with Tradition-Oriented Religiousness, four of which 
appear in Table 2; the average eta-squared across the eight items was .21 (.20 with ipsatized 
data). This provides further support for religious behaviors/beliefs as a key location for cross-
cultural differences. Second, four of the “family values” items measure hierarchy, that is, tradi-
tional gender roles. These four items had an average eta-squared of .20 (although only .14 with 
ipsatized data). Third, four of the GLOBE normative-practices items measure in-group (or fam-
ily) collectivism, and the four together had an average eta-squared of .20 (again, .14 with ipsa-
tized data). Their content concerns differing generations, closeness between generations within 
the family, as did two regularity-norm items (those involving parent–child sleeping arrangements 
and the impact of ancestors). This family-oriented collectivism (Vandello & Cohen, 1999), as 
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Table 2. Items Showing the Largest Cross-Population Differences Across 30 Countries.
η2 ηips
2 ICC ICCips Item in full
.39 .31 .37 .29 How often do you spend time in private religious activities, such as prayer, 
meditation, or study of religious scriptures? (d)
.39 .27 .38 .27 How often do you attend church, mosque, temple, or other religious 
meetings? (d)
.36 .29 .35 .27 I try hard to carry my religion over into all other dealings in life. (d)
.33 .28 .32 .27 Religion should play the most important role in civil affairs. (i)
.33 .26 .32 .25 My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life. (d)
.31 .26 .30 .25 In this society, children generally live at home with their parents until they 
get married. (g)
.31 .25 .31 .24 At a critical moment, a divine power will step in to help our people. (e)
.30 .23 .31 .24 In this society, a mother sleeps with her child until well past the child’s 
second birthday. (r)
.30 .25 .28 .23 I adhere to an organized religion. (i)
.28 .21 .28 .21 We need tough leaders who can silence the troublemakers and restore our 
traditional values. (i)
.27 .20 .26 .19 Men and women each have different roles to play in society. (m)
.26 .20 .24 .18 If you are protecting what is sacred and holy, anything you do is moral and 
justifiable. (e)
.26 .18 .28 .17 In this society, aging parents generally live at home with their children. (g)
.26 .19 .24 .17 [What’s right vs. wrong can be decided based on] Whether or not 
someone’s action showed love for his or her country. (m)
.26 .20 .23 .19 I honor the glorious heroes among my people who sacrificed themselves 
for our destiny and our heritage. (n)
.25 .19 .23 .17 In my life, I experience the presence of the Divine. (d)
.24 .20 .25 .21 Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. (m)
.23 .16 .23 .16 In this society, individuals occasionally become possessed by a spirit, who 
temporarily takes possession of that individual’s body. (r)
.23 .19 .22 .18 My first loyalty is to the heritage of my ancestors, their language, and their 
religion. (n)
.23 .17 .23 .17 I can always trust the government to do what is right. (i)
.23 .18 .23 .18 My honor is worth defending, even aggressively. (p)
.23 .16 .22 .15 In this society, people fear that if they break social rules then others will 
use sorcery or witchcraft against them. (r)
.22 .17 .21 .16 I believe in predestination—that all things have been divinely determined 
beforehand. (i)
.22 .15 .22 .15 The mother should accept the decisions of the father. (f)
.22 .17 .21 .17 In this society, people believe that the spirits of dead ancestors are active 
and can affect events in everyday life. (r)
.22 .16 .22 .16 The father should be the head of the family. (f)
.22 .18 .23 .19 The homeland of my people is sacred because of its monuments to our 
ancestors and heroes. (n)
.21 .14 .19 .13 I am proud of my country’s history. (m)
.21 .17 .21 .17 I believe in the superiority of my own ethnic group. (i)
.21 .16 .22 .16 In this society, boys are encouraged more than girls to attain a higher 
education. (g)
.20 .18 .20 .18 In this society, teen-aged students are encouraged to strive for 
continuously improved performance. (g)
.20 .16 .20 .16 My ancestors once lived in a golden age with glorious and beautiful 
achievements. (n)
(continued)
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distinct from the collectivism captured in survey measures of Triandis and Gelfand (1998), is 
another possible content area with substantial cross-cultural differences.
In sum, the largest cross-cultural differences were found to reflect four kinds of content: 
behaviors and beliefs indicating devotion to religion, ethnonationalism, hierarchical family 
values, and aspects of family-oriented collectivism. The other sources of items showed aver-
age eta-squared values in the vicinity of .10. In Table 3, the content most often studied cross-
culturally—GLOBE normative practices, social axioms, Triandis individualism and collectivism, 
Schwartz values, and tightness–looseness—is found intermixed with content such as personality, 
isms, and moral foundations that have attracted far less interest for capturing differences between 
populations. This is in line with cultural effect-size estimates for values and personality in previ-
ous studies (see, for example, Fischer & Schwartz, 2011, Table 1; van Hemert, 2011, Table 5.1; 
Fischer and Schwartz likewise observed elevated effect sizes for values related to religiosity).
Discussion
Major Implications
The central message of these findings is quite clear. If a cross-cultural psychologist wishes to 
focus on variables that generate strong differences between populations, one good strategy is to 
focus on beliefs connected to religion (or the metaphysical), and especially on practices and 
behaviors that reflect the everyday impact of religion on persons. The central message here reso-
nates with recent arguments by others (Tarakeshwar, Stanton, & Pargament, 2003; also Fischer 
& Schwartz, 2011; Georgas, van de Vijver, & Berry, 2004). Religiousness tends to have high 
within-country variation (see, for example, Fischer & Schwartz, 2011) but the between-country 
variation is so great as to yield high ICC values nonetheless.
Such a psychologist should include in the high-priority list “regularity-norms” (Hechter & 
Opp, 2001): ways of doing things that are widespread, conventional, only partly moralized, 
η2 ηips
2 ICC ICCips Item in full
.20 .15 .20 .15 Foreigners have stolen land from our people and they are now trying to 
steal more. (e)
.20 .14 .20 .14 The father should handle the money in the house. (f)
.20 .15 .21 .16 Going to war can sometimes be sacred and righteous. (e)
.19 .12 .19 .12 Religious faith contributes to good mental health. (a)
.19 .15 .21 .16 It is always smart to be completely truthful. (h)
.19 .24 .22 .28 In this society, alcohol is consumed frequently and occasionally in great 
quantities. (r)
.19 .13 .20 .14 Parents and children must stay together as much as possible. (c)
.18 .17 .17 .16 What is good can be judged only by the gratification of the senses. (i)
.18 .14 .18 .13 [What’s right vs. wrong can be decided based on] Whether or not 
someone was good at math. (m)
.18 .22 .23 .23 My own race is not superior to any other race. (i)
Note. n ranges from 7,268 to 7,871 depending on the item. η2 and ICC indicate the proportion of between-individual 
variance in the item accounted for by between-country differences. Letters in parentheses indicate the item-pool 
source: (a) social axioms, (c) collectivism, (d) Duke Religion Index, (e) extremist thinking patterns, (f) family values, (g) 
GLOBE normative practices, (h) Machiavellianism, (i) isms, (m) moral foundations, (n) ethnonationalism, (p) proneness 
to aggress (culture of honor), (r)—added “regularity norm” items derived from anthropological literature. See 
supplementary document for similar analyses conducted across all 33 nations, and for other supplementary notes. η2 
= eta-squared; ICC = intraclass correlation (ICC[1]); ips = in ipsatized data.
Table 2. (continued)
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distinct to one culture versus another, and less systematized than those associated with religion. 
Culture might be conceived as mainly a rather loose association of multitudinous conventions 
(Poortinga, 2011). The contrast between religious- and regularity-norms is potentially quite 
strong, as the former involves explicit and the latter more implicit cultural models. These may be 
two quite different levels of culture of nearly equal importance.
In addition, ethnonationalist sentiments should make that priority list. But this may be due to 
their quasi-religious character. Anthony D. Smith, on whose work the present ethnonationalism 
items are based (Saucier, 2014), has characterized it as a “political religion” or a “surrogate reli-
gion” (Smith, 2001, p. 35). Ethnonationalism has appeal and endurance based on “deep-rooted, 
enduring religious beliefs and sentiments, and a powerful sense of the sacred” requiring “abso-
lute loyalty” (Smith, 2003, p. vii). Ethnonationalism is important beyond cross-cultural psychol-
ogy, as it seems to play a large and creative role in the formation of independent nation-states 
while also creating some risk for conflict and violence (e.g., ethnic cleansing).
Values related to family roles and regularity-norms for family living arrangements—those 
aspects most associated with tradition (e.g., tendencies toward three generations in one house-
hold, and toward families with institutionalized father-dominance, that is, “patriarchal”)—should 
also have a higher profile in cross-cultural psychology. These tend to show between-population 
differences above what is typical for psychological variables. Cultural contexts in which parents 
and children are more likely to live—and sleep—together appear to be those in which transmitted 
culture takes place proportionally more across-generations rather than peer-to-peer—what 
Margaret Mead (1970) called postfigurative (rather than cofigurative) cultures.
Table 3. Comparison of Item-Pool Sources: Average Eta-Squared Values Across Items From Each 
Source.
Mean η2
Item source No. itemsOriginal Ipsatized
.34 .26 Duke Religion Index 5
.23 .18 Nationalism (ethnonationalism only) 4
.22 .18 Regularity-norm behaviors, derived from 
anthropological literature
6
.16 .15 Family values 8
.14 .12 Proneness to aggress (culture of honor) 3
.14 .11 Extremist thinking patterns 17
.13 .12 Isms 46
.12 .11 Moral foundations 22
.12 .10 GLOBE normative practices 43
.12 .10 Machiavellianism 5
.10 .10 Social axioms 30
.10 .08 Individualism–collectivism 16
.09 .09 Materialism 4
.08 .07 Values (short Schwartz) 10
.07 .09 Cultural tightness–looseness 6
.07 .08 Nationalism (multiculturalist civic nationalism only) 2
.07 .07 Personality (Big Six) 40
.07 .06 Amoralism 14
.12 .10 Total pool of Items 281
Note. Means computed across eta-squared values derived from analyses with N ranging from 7,268 to 7,871. “No. 
Items” refers to the number of items in each source, across which the respective mean is computed.
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These results might provide a spur to theoretical development. What theory of culture can best 
make sense of the high profile of religion, regularity-norms, and ethnonationalism, and perhaps 
also traditional hierarchical family values, in how populations differ? Such a theory might have 
more power than many of the theoretical frames current in cross-cultural psychology.
These results argue against insularity. They highlight the overlap of cultural psychology with 
the psychology of religion, political psychology, and family sociology. These disciplines may be 
artificially compartmentalized and separated from one another. Such an observation has been 
made before. Renshon (2002) argued that political psychology rests on cultural foundations. 
A. B. Cohen (2009; see also Geertz, 1973) argued that definitions of culture and of religion are 
interrelated, and both involve shared beliefs and values that are transmitted across generations. 
Durkheim (1982, p. 129) postulated that a “religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices,” 
which would be shared and thus partially cultural in nature.
Possible Rival Hypotheses
The conclusions just presented derive from rather substantial differences in effect size: what 
emerges when emphasis is placed on large as contrasted with medium effects. However, there are 
various potential objections. These might potentially offer important qualifications or nuance to 
the basic conclusions just reviewed. Even if not resolved here, they provide a stimulus to further 
research inquiries. The possible objections are as follows:
1. Poor translations could affect effect-size estimates. Standard back-translation proce-
dures were employed, so we do not consider this a likely story. But interested readers 
can judge for themselves after reviewing the translations (http://psychometriglossia.
uoregon.edu/).
2. It may be that various kinds of content are differentially easy to translate; those easier to 
translate might yield items and data with less measurement error and higher effect sizes. 
Thus, a plausible (though we think unlikely) rival hypothesis deserves some consider-
ation: Items regarding religious practices and family roles and living arrangements are 
particularly easy to translate, whereas those regarding values, social axioms, and so on, 
are less easy to translate.
3. Table 2 provides coefficients both for original and ipsatized ratings. If results are about 
the same for ipsatized as for original ratings, it indicates that individual differences in use 
of the rating scale (acquiescent, middle, or extreme responding) are probably not affect-
ing results in a major way. Ipsatization usually overshoots the mark in correcting for 
response bias: It forces all individuals to have the same response mean and variance, even 
though some portion of the variation in response means and variances is probably valid—
reflecting that some people have naturally more or less to agree with in a selection of 
survey items, and some have naturally more versus less intensity in this agreement. Here, 
coefficients with and without ipsatization typically differed little, suggesting that findings 
cannot be attributed to response-bias differences between populations. But further studies 
are needed to confirm and evaluate this conclusion. Response biases clearly contribute to 
statistical differences between populations (van Hemert, 2011). Precise estimates of 
effect sizes will be impossible until the response-bias component is isolated.
4. Reference-group effects (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002), which arise from 
subjective standards in use of rating scales that differ across populations, can wash out 
real effects. This would provide a reasonable account of findings presented here if high-
cultural-difference items (e.g., religious behaviors and beliefs) were more behaviorally 
concrete or used less subjective rating scales than the lower-difference items. Indeed, 
here, the only two items involving a behavior-count (never, once a week, etc.) were those 
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two DRI items that showed the very largest differences between populations. However, 
other DRI items had large differences while referring to beliefs regarding and valuing of 
religion rather than concrete behaviors, and while using rather subjective rating scales 
(how true, on a 5-point scale). Generally, the items on the survey differed very little in 
how subjective the rating scale was, yet had wide variance in size of effects. It seems that 
concrete-behavior reference and a non-subjective rating scale both contribute to larger 
cross-population differences, but content is also a powerful contributor. A more compre-
hensive research design, systematically varying concreteness and rating scale (as well as 
standard vs. referent-shift format) for each kind of content, would be needed to draw 
conclusions as to the relative power of these contributors to difference.
5. The present study drew participants from institutions of higher education. This no doubt 
has some impact on effect-size estimates. Arguably, college students are relatively cos-
mopolitan, and are located within institutions patterned in Western academic models, and 
so would tend to be similar across countries, to a greater degree than general populations 
would be; this might attenuate country differences on some or all variables. Another argu-
ment would be that college students in societies with lower average levels of education 
are a high-status elite, unlike in countries with more-educated people (see, for example, 
Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1999); this argument does not seem to account well for differ-
ences in religiousness (here “elite” students from less-educated countries scored as much 
more religious generally than the presumably more plebeian students from more-
educated countries), but it could conceivably account for unexpectedly small country 
differences in individualism/collectivism. A third possibility: Students might be prone to 
vary more than general populations do on some variables (e.g., religious practices and 
beliefs?) and vary less than general populations do on other variables (e.g., individualism/
collectivism?). This would make sense if general populations are generally quite religious 
(and/or prone to vary highly on collectivism/individualism), but contrastingly student 
populations in some though not all countries are distinctly non-religious (and/or if student 
populations were all about equally individualistic). While plausible, this scenario is not 
one supported by Study 3 of Fischer and Schwartz (2011), in which a 62-nation set of 
representative samples gave generally similar results to those reported here (e.g., ICC of 
.30 for an item referencing the importance of God in one’s life, lower ICC for other types 
of content). These are difficult issues: “It is almost impossible to select a subgroup in one 
cultural population so that it will precisely match a subgroup in another culture . . . match-
ing on one variable almost inevitably leads to mismatching on other variables” (Berry, 
Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis, & Sam, 2011, p. 22). The best remedy may be repli-
cation across studies using varying selection rationales.
6. Perhaps certain kinds of content are very easy to measure in a survey format, whereas 
others are not. And, those that are easy to measure generate more apparent cross-population 
differences. Ease-to-measure would be reflected in higher internal consistency in groups 
of items scored together, but a better index is probably retest stability because it can be 
investigated at the single-item level, and for truly easy-to-measure variables a single item 
might be a sufficient measure. The data used here had no retest component. It is possible 
that, for reasons beyond accuracy of translation or response biases, religious behaviors 
and beliefs are uniquely easy to measure (perhaps because people have more easily 
retrievable schemas for them). This possibility cannot be evaluated with the present data, 
but deserves attention in future research.
7. Perhaps conventional cross-cultural psychology variables reflect where important differ-
ences were found a generation or two ago, but such things are fluid: Now, the clearly 
biggest differences are in religious behaviors and beliefs, etc., even if this was not the 
case at the founding of cross-cultural psychology. By this account, the present results are 
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just a snapshot of 2012, and may not generalize to other periods. This account would 
seem quite strong if our standard for comparison were the last 100 years: Many countries 
now relatively indifferent to religion were more highly religious a century ago. Religion 
has been declining in some countries while remaining strong in others (Inglehart & Baker, 
2000). Cross-cultural psychology is not quite that old, but historical change may account 
for some portion of the findings presented here, given historical trends that have seen 
religion decline in some but not all locations on the globe.
Suggestions for Future Studies
As noted earlier, the populations sampled in this study were not predominantly from Western 
industrialized democracies as in most psychology studies, but were more educated (and probably 
rich) than nationally representative samples would have been. It would be useful to repeat this 
approach in data sets that have more representative samples, particularly where the variable 
selection is very wide as here. It would also be useful to extend this approach to a truly wide 
diversity of human cultures, such as those represented in the often much smaller-scale societies 
sampled in the Human Relations Area Files (Ember, 1997).
Analyses here focused entirely on the item level, and so are most directly relevant to a particu-
lar situation, not atypical in large-N surveys where participant time is expensive and precious, 
where one might wish to capture large-magnitude cross-cultural differences with a few items. For 
that situation, Tables 2 and 3 give information about what to expect if differing kinds of content 
are selected. The tables do not enable inferences regarding the measurement properties of any 
scales from which the items come; these would require a different, larger set of analyses.
Moreover, present analyses focused entirely at the individual level, using country only as an 
independent grouping variable to demarcate differing populations. It would be useful to examine 
the isomorphism of these individual-level results with what might be found at the country level. 
This would be in keeping with lines of research (e.g., Minkov, 2012) that regard culture as mainly 
a collective-level phenomenon, not optimally approached with individual-level data. One must 
acknowledge of course the limitations of letting “nation” stand for “culture.”
Specifically, further studies should address the degree to which the items studied here can be 
meaningfully grouped into the originally intended scales, preferably demonstrating partial or full 
measurement invariance. Non-invariance might affect the estimates presented here, which are 
preliminary and broad-brush. Studies of measurement invariance will allow more precise esti-
mates and interpretations, and identify areas in which assessment tools need improvement.
The largest cross-cultural differences were found to reflect four kinds of content (behaviors 
and beliefs relating to religion, ethnonationalism, hierarchical family values, and aspects of fam-
ily-oriented collectivism). It would be useful to examine the structure of these kinds of content, 
their degree of intercorrelation both between and within populations. There are indications of 
some common threads among them: According to Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel (2002), tradi-
tional attitudes including religion are associated with inegalitarian gender roles.
Finally, this study emphasized the relative effect sizes of cross-cultural difference. Ideally, the 
field would “strike a balance between similarities and differences in such a way that we can 
interpret differences against a background of similarities (or the other way around)” (van de 
Vijver, Chasiotis, & Breugelmans, 2011, p. 15). Studies of cross-cultural similarities are poten-
tially complementary to the approach taken here, which emphasized differences.
Conclusion
Survey of World Views data is unique in its combination of diverse sampling of countries with 
extensive sampling of variables. First, analyses of the data seem to point quite clearly 
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to particular paths—roads usually not taken—with respect to research and theory in the field. 
Cross-cultural psychology would do well to cast a wider net in terms of the psychological vari-
ables of focus. Consistent with some other studies, we found that the most popular variables in 
cross-cultural psychology show only medium-sized effects for nation/culture; there are clearly 
numerous other psychological variables showing effects of this magnitude. But with a large 
effect size, cultures differ in religious/supernatural beliefs and especially in religious behaviors. 
They differ in the intensity of ethnonationalist sentiments (which are, arguably, quasi-religious). 
They differ in what sociologists call regularity norms, including some involving family living 
arrangements. And they differ in their views of appropriate family roles, especially perhaps as 
related to gender. These findings suggest that the now-standard compartmentalization—by which 
the psychology of culture is separated from psychology of religion, family sociology, and politi-
cal psychology—may hinder both empirical discovery and theoretical integration.
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